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ABSTRACT
The relation between religion and human rights has 
becomes ambiguous. In the past, religion had inspired the 
idea of human rights. Most religions acknowledge that 
human rights are the rights that a person has due to his 
status as a human entity created by God. This identity was 
substantial for his dignity as an individual and his ethical 
obligations as a member of a community. But after religion 
was suppressed or replaced by modernity and ideological 
regimes, the idea of human rights began to be based upon 
the concept of the good life, the common good, or human 
flourishing. With this disconnect, human rights needs to be 
re-evaluated according to different religious traditions. This 
paper deals with the complexities of the ethical question 
concerning the ideal of good life under the norms of human 
rights. It proposes the idea that secular societies should 
take into account the historical role of religion in shaping 
the idea of the human to provide a moral foundation. 
But since religion cannot break away completely from 
fundamentalism, a new moral foundation inspired by 
religion but beyond religion is needed. The paper, then, will 
deal with the problem into three stages: the religious roots 
of human rights, religion-based-violence, and suggestions 
for a moral foundation of human rights beyond religion.
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Human Rights and Its Religious Roots 
In his essay on Glauben und Wissen (Faith and Knowledge), 
J. Habermas claimed that the tension between secularization and 
fundamentalism will become one of the main characteristics of post-
secularized society.1 The secular world has created one pole in which 
reason, science and technology are taken as its foundation. Meaning, 
values, morality, and the good life must all relate to the concept of 
human well-being. By promoting reason, the secular world demands that 
each religion should be harmonized with modern civilization. Religion 
on the other hand, creates its own gounding. It has its own truth which 
sometimes rejects reason. Habermas reminds us that by rejecting reason, 
the fundamentalists can use violence and terrorism as ways to defending 
their truth against the secular world.2 In such cases, the resurgence of 
religions in the secular world does not always constitute a blessing for 
humanity. Our civil and global relations are often overshadowed by 
religious conflicts and the violence. 
This tension between fundamentalism and secularization has its 
implication to the meaning of human rights. In the past, religion can be 
regarded as an important factor that brings about human rights. Although 
its formal formula emerged in the 20th century, the basic inspirations of 
human rights have been found in ancient religious beliefs and practices 
such as the concept of agreement with God in the Jewish tradition, 
Quranic texts on peace and mutual benefit, Hindu’s concept of dharma 
and atma, the Catholics’ concept of ius and libertos, and the Protestant 
ideal of freedom and law. All these traditions claim that human beings 
are given basic rights by the Creator.
The relationship between religion and human rights has a new 
emphasis in the post-secularized society. In the first place, under the 
principle of the freedom of religion,3 each religion claims its own right to 
exist. In this post-secularized society, religion can play its role in reminding 
people about the problematic aspects of modern lifestyles. Among other 
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things, religion shows that the modern world which reduces reality into 
a rational, scientific, economic, and technological framework will end 
with failure. Spiritual life is something that is intrinsic to being human 
and cannot be ignored. 
Also religion reminds us that the modern secular state system 
with its democratic, economic and technological aspects has not really 
succeeded in providing an authentic sense of national and cultural identity. 
Ernst Gellner has pointed out that, in the post-colonial era, developing 
countries faced a dilemma: whether to imitate Western patterns to 
achieve equality in life, or remain in their own cultural traditions, with 
the result that material conditions of life did not develop. Initially, many 
developing countries followed the Western pattern in building their 
societies, but after some decades it turned out that the Western model 
was not successful because it led to authoritarianism, corruption, and a 
return to a primordialism that endangered national integration.4 All these 
conditions brought forth a need for a more authentic sense of identity. 
Based on human rights every country and culture affirms its own authentic 
identity. A new understanding of Human rights became the philosophical 
basis for the political recognition of national identity in many countries. 
This philosophical affirmation of the function of human rights in a 
society to define the authentic identity, however, goes hand in hand with 
anti-foreign movement which creates excessive suspicion and hostility 
towards anything foreign. In such a situation of total disillusion and 
paranoia, human rights as modern norms for the good life have been 
heavily criticized. From a philosophical point of view, some philosophers 
consider human rights as an unsuccessful experiment. They regard it as 
a fiction and an instrument of neocolonialism used by the Western world 
to control the non-Western world. They also claim that human rights 
become a strategy to give birth to cultural conflicts, social instability, and 
religious wars so that the world remains dependent on the West. Marry 
Ann Glendon says: “right talk is the wrong talk for meaningful debate 
about debate deep questions of justice, peace, and common good.”  
In this critical condition, religion takes its role as an important 
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factor to balance the secular motive behind the application of human rights. 
In the theological perspective, without religion, human rights would be 
controlled by Western liberal ideals and political identity. Only in religion, 
we can understand that the concept of human rights is inherent with the 
concept of duty. Pope John XXIII wrote: “every fundamental human right 
draws its indestructible moral force from natural law, which, in granting 
it imposes a corresponding obligation. Those, therefore, who claim their 
rights, yet altogether or neglect to carry out their respective duties, are 
people who build with one hand and destroy with the other.”6 Under this 
theological understanding, human rights can impose moral requirements 
universally valid in the world of human experience and history since it 
is rooted in the nature of man and of human society. 
Religion-Based-Violations
The recognition of the religious dimension in human rights or the 
recognition of human rights by the religious world is one thing, but the 
application of human rights in the praxis of religions is another matter. 
When human rights declare equality and teach freedom, the world of 
religion emphasizes hierarchy and authority; when human rights celebrate 
diversity, tolerance and pluralism, religion demands purity of orthodoxy, 
exclusivity and diversity; where human rights teach freedom of speech 
and expression, some religions suggest total surrender, restraint or silence; 
when human rights are embraced in such a way as to become universal 
values, religion as an institution is threatened. So it is hard to deny that 
behind the religious idealism that emphasizes peace, compassion, honesty, 
justice and brotherhood, religions actually emphasize a strong tendency 
towards radicalism, bigotry, group selfishness, megalomania, corruption, 
chauvinism, and various forms of violence that are diametrically opposed 
to human rights. Based on its some interpretations of religious doctrines, 
religion can become a motive for doing violence. We call this contradiction 
as religion-based violence.
This phenomenon can be empirically pointed out by some surveys. 
Besides bomb attacks in Bali, Surabaya, and Medan, SETARA Institute 
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reported that 3.177 cases of religious radicalism have been conducted 
in the last 12 years (2007-2018). Recently (October 2019), Indonesian 
Survey Institute’s research shows that religious radicalism is a serious 
problem in living together among religious communities. The survey 
discovered that 53% of Muslims object to non-Muslims building their 
place of worship near them, but 54% are tolerant if non-Muslim people 
hold religious services near them. In the last four years, the trend of 
political intolerance towards non-Muslims has increased from 48% to 
56% in a sense that the majority does not want non-Muslims to be their 
leaders. The survey also points it out that 23.5% of Muslim students in 
Indonesia support the movements of the Islamic countries of Iraq and 
Syria, and are even ready to strive to establish a khilafah.7 
This tendency is formulated in another way by the National 
Commission on Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia. In its 2015 
report on freedom of religion and beliefs, the Commission found out some 
forms of violence: closing of existing places of worship, demolition of 
places of worship that had long been used, prohibition of using veil in 
school, intimidation and prohibition of religious activities. The National 
Human Rights Commission also notes that all religions have committed 
violence and potentially violate human rights. 
A philosophical reflection on this phenomenon may help us 
to understand the fact. In her writings on the vita activa (The Human 
Condition), Hannah Arendt distinguished three fundamental human 
activities, namely labor, work, and action. These three activities are closely 
related to the most common conditions of human existence: birth and 
death, natality and mortality. Labor means that we humans maintain the 
survival of individuals and species as a whole. Work is the way we do 
every day activities which support life such as eating, drinking and other 
related activities. It is an activity related to biological processes which are 
necessary for the continuation of human existence. Different from labor, 
work is a productive activity in achieving certain material goals. With work 
humans can create the world around them in accordance with their plans 
and needs. Work gives us permanence and durability in gaining meaning 
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in our lives and warding off the futility of mortality. Human action is also 
a productive activity but has no connection to the production of material 
objects. It includes human communication with each other and which 
allows them to live together in a society. By such action, humans create 
history, honor the past, and look forward to the future.9
Of these three activities, violence is more visible in labor and 
work, and less visible at action. It is because violence is related to the 
needs to maintain human existence in facing environmental challenges. 
By identifying violence as labor, Arendt identifies three hallmarks of 
violence.10 First, like labor, “violence is essentially instrumental and 
material.”11 It is governed by the categories of means and end. As an 
instrument, violence is designed and used to multiply strength. Its 
justification is derived from the end it serves. It can be “justifiable, but 
never will be legitimate.” 12  Religion-based-violence is a kind of violence 
which uses religion as its propaganda. It is effective because only in 
religion we can find blind loyalty.
Second, violence is mute. Arendt points out that in essence violence 
is speechless. There is no speech in violence. It is “incapable of speech.”13 
Therefore, Arendt can say: “where violence rules absolutely … not only 
the laws … but everything and everybody must fall silent.”  This muteness 
makes violence destroys precisely the solidarity of word and deed that 
is necessary for action. Without speech, action degrades into a merely 
productive, technological activity. 
Third, violence is characterized by its preference for isolation. 
Tyranny may become its extreme form. Without speech, violence 
places man into the mass in which no body can exist as somebody. As 
consequence there can be no longer any process of uncovering of the who. 
Because of its instrumentality and muteness, violence creates a solitary 
man who has no capability to bring relations into existence. 
By these descriptions of violence, we can say that in Arendt’s 
perspective, all forms of religious violence are the instrumental reaction 
to the process of alienation, especially alienation from the secularized 
society. By using religion as its justification, violence destroys human 
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communication and togetherness. Behind violence grows the most effective 
command which produces the most instant and perfect obedience. By this 
way, it overlooks power which is fundamentally based on communication 
and togetherness. Violence, then, will not create human communication, 
togetherness and power but alienation. The religion-based violence then 
is a result of religious purification by each religious group to strengthen 
its stronghold of identity and territory. This isolation process results in 
paralysis of communication and social dialogue. 
Religion-based-violence has occurred since the crusades in the 
medieval times. Today Christians, Jews and even Hindus also have a record 
of violence due to deviations of religious values. In this case, religion is 
used as a propaganda tool for blind loyalty. Arendt then concludes that all 
violence, includes here the religious-based-violence - is a actus hominis 
rather than actus humanus. For her, humans are conditioned beings since 
everything that is contacted and exposed to humans, immediately becomes 
a condition of human existence; it becomes a condition of our existence 
as far as it becomes a part of us. As far as it can humanize labor and work, 
communication can also become the basis for human rights. And as far as 
communication becomes the basis for human rights, all practical efforts 
to promote human rights cannot be pushed by violent actions.
Moral Foundation of Human Rights
The inability of the world’s religions to promote the good life 
became one of the reasons for secularists to try to replace religion with 
a new model of good life which can be taken into account by science. 
Sam Harris may be one of the scientists who mercilessly and relentlessly 
attacks religion. For Harris, instead of developing ethical sensitivity, 
religion tends to confuse people’s ethical perceptions of the good and 
the bad. Their people are moral when they conquer or kill; they feel holy 
precisely when they self-destruct; they feel loyal to their religion precisely 
by promoting discrimination. According to Harris, religion is one of the 
biggest barriers to sound moral reasoning, although ideally the use of 
reason is always obligatory.  
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Harris proposes that ethics or morality does not require religion as 
its basis. “Research on people’s response to unfamiliar moral dilemmas 
suggests that religion has no effect on moral judgment.”  He reasons that 
each religion claims to be based on certain revelations, but the contents 
of the revelations and scriptures are different and can be contradict one 
another. Religious revelations also legitimize inhumane violent practices 
such as slavery, misogyny, patriarchy, mutilation, self-immolation, and 
practices such as Sati. So it is clear that not all revelations can be regarded 
as truth. Instead of religious revelations, Harris contends that human 
moral intuition is developed in a long evolutionary process. It is not a 
gift from something we call God. Such things as soul or spirit does not 
exist. Our awareness is only a product of brain performance. When the 
brain is damaged, mental abilities are damaged. For the continuity of the 
ethical life of the human species what is needed is a picture of the good 
life that should be taken into account by science alone. This is what he 
calls the moral landscape.
In Moral Landscape, Harris criticizes the modern dualistic way 
of thinking that separates science and ethics: science talks about the 
world of facts, ethics talks about values of how we ought to behave. This 
distinction was developed by David Hume and G.E. Moore. To Harris, 
the separation of facts and values  is an illusion, due to three causes. First, 
anything that can be known about prosperous life must be related to the 
facts of the world and the facts of the brain’s performance in its interactions 
with the world. Second, what we called as objective scientific knowledge 
about facts is in fact always built on certain principles that are considered 
valuable such as logical consistency, supporting evidence, simplicity of 
theory, etc. Third, it is proved that in the brain’s performance, belief in 
facts and values  derived from one and the same internal neural process, 
the process of judging about right or wrong.17
Harris is of opinion that values  are the ideal problem of a prosperous 
life or well-being which basically is based on facts and can be learned 
by science, especially neuroscience. The parameters of prosperous life 
are universal and can be assessed objectively wrong and right. They are 
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transcending any cultural or religious tradition. Just as the facts about 
disease are universal - cancer is cancer, cholera is cholera – so are ethical 
norms - compassion is compassion. There are no ethical norms which 
can be verified by religions such as by Hinduism, Islam, or Christianity. 
Just as the concept of health is changed according to the 
increasingly complex of knowledge and experience, the notion of human 
rights is indeed dynamic. But it does not mean that the notion of human 
rights is relative. People’s preferences for food can be diversified, but 
we can investigate which foods are healthy or poisonous. So is the 
concept of human rights. Each community and institution has its specific 
concept of human rights, but we can determine its objective measures, 
at least a minimum condition of practice of human rights, such as: non-
discriminative and equality, religious tolerance, the level of security etc. 
From the perspective of human rights, we can criticize the darker traditions 
in certain cultures. From this point of view, people who practice these 
things are conditioned to want what they should not want. So they can 
be reformed.
Harris’s criticism of religion’s claim as the foundation of human 
morality and human rights is a good step to define that morality is not an 
emotional and subjective fact but must be rational and universal. But by 
using science as the tool to describe the moral landscape, Harris falls into 
the trap of scientism which proposes that the truth of morality depends 
on scientific discovery. Harris seems to negate the practical reason of 
each subject to know the good and the bad of the actions on the one hand 
and the ability of the cultural community to reach consensus regarding 
common goals which must be realized in the community on the other side. 
Harris seems to define morality in a mechanistic way of thinking in 
which good and bad action depends on the mechanism of neural system. 
There is no freedom in morality and no ability to weigh the maxim of 
legitimate action as Kant pointed it out in his categorical principle: “Act 
only on the maxim where you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law.”18 But, why we must have an obligation to respect 
the rights of others? 
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In the Kantian perspective, the moral foundations of human rights 
lie in the categorical, universal and rational obligations to the rights of 
others. He argues that there is something about a human being that makes 
him resent and resist being treated as a means instead of an end. The 
individual human being becomes the basis for the supreme principle of 
morality: “the foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an 
end in itself. All men everywhere want to be considered persons instead 
of things for the same reason that I do, and this affirmation of the absolute 
worth of the individual leads to a second formulation of the categorical 
imperative which says: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own 
person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means 
only.”19 The categorical imperative, therefore, speaks of the universality 
of the moral law and affirms the supreme worth of each rational person.
Kant’s categorical imperative on treating ‘humanity as the end not 
as the means’ has a similarity to the golden rule: “do to others what you 
want others to do to you.” In a sense that the concept of human rights 
is not just a claim about rights but also about duty. “the recognition of 
the right not to be reduced to slavery implies the responsibility of those 
who own others to give them their freedom. The right not to be tortured 
implies the responsibility of the torturer not to torture. The exercise of 
rights and freedom is subject to duties.”20 The moral foundation of the 
human rights then rests on a philosophy rooted in the subject.
Beside the philosophy of subject, the moral foundation of human 
rights rests on the internal relationship between the practical reason and 
the intersubjective cultural community. In these intersubjective cultural 
communities, all citizens, both religious citizens and secular citizens, have 
the same right to communicate and be heard. For these reasons religion 
can be accepted as one part of the “oeffentliche Gebrauch der Vernunft” 
(public use of reason). And because human reason no longer depends on 
the religious legitimacy, but on consensus that is built together through 
discourse, the contribution of religion must be translated into publicly 
acceptable language. Meanwhile, the secular citizens must also learn 
something about normative truth as religious revelation by re-recognizing 
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their own intuitions which are often not examined. Thus the arrogance 
of religious exclusivism which values  secular citizens as infidels and the 
arrogance of secularism which condemns  religion as irrational can be 
avoided. Religion and secularity are two components of our civilization 
and therefore components of our value systems in our communication 
and intersubjective world.21
Conclusion
Mary Ann Glendon once said that the Declaration of Human Rights 
“is the single most important reference point for cross-cultural discussion 
of human freedom and dignity in the world today.”22 The statement 
summarizes the historical fact of promulgation of the human rights in the 
United Nations. When human rights were about to be endorsed by the 
United Nations, the question of the foundation of human rights was raised. 
The background of question was the conflict of value orientation between 
liberalism which characterized the Western world and collectivism which 
characterized the eastern world, between universalism and cultural 
difference, between those who are secular and those who are religious. 
Today human rights have been accepted and amended in many 
countries as practical response to the war crimes and various forms of 
violence against humanity. But violence is still carried out around the 
world, as witnessed in genocide in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, civil 
wars in many corners of the world, terrorist attacks, and human trafficking. 
How can we explain the failure of human rights?
One of the most determining factors for the decline of human 
rights is a selective and pragmatic approach that ignores the ethical 
foundation of human rights, namely the human person. The human rights 
discourse is used whenever there is oppression, slavery, conflict, war, 
human trafficking, and genocide. In facing all these problem, the concept 
of human rights is used as an instrumental justification of political and 
social action. The pragmatic approach may be useful in facing the problem. 
But the act of pragmatic judgment should be morally accepted. Without 
ethical underpinning, human rights will have no legitimation. 
Mikhael Dua    59
Religion can play its role in overcoming mere pragmatism. 
Through its understanding of human nature as rational and free being, 
religion can provide moral basis for the necessity and universality of 
human rights. But in doing this, religion must learn how to develop its 
own beliefs in a rational way. In dialogue with science, it can play its 
role more productive. In this new public sphere, both science and religion 
can develop a rational and democratic commonsense which is accepted 
by all. By doing this, religion does not only gives moral legitimation to 
human rights but also creates an emancipatory world.
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